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Abstract 
According to Bernard Stiegler’s theory of techno-evolution, technologies have an intrinsically 
pharmacological nature. This means that they are simultaneously supportive and destructive 
for sociotechnical practices based on them. Technological innovations always first disrupt 
existing sociotechnical practices, but can and should then always be appropriated by the social 
system to be turned into a new technical system upon which new sociotechnical practices are 
based. As constituted and conditioned by a technical system, agriculture is necessarily a 
system of care. Current deployment of transgenic technologies under capitalist conditions 
induce processes of proletarianization in agriculture, which has led to their widespread 
rejection. However, they can and should become the basis of a new system of care, but only 
under the condition that they are wrought from corporate control and redeployed to initiate a 
process of deproletarianization. 
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1. Introduction 
This short article discusses the relevance of the work of the French philosopher of technology 
Bernard Stiegler (1952) for addressing techno-ethical and techno-political issues in 
agricultural innovation, in particular regarding the use of genetic engineering technologies. 
Before specifically dealing with his work on agriculture and agricultural innovation, the 
article wil first provide a short introduction to the broader scope of his work and to the most 
important aspects of his view on technology and technological change. It will then focus on 
his theory of agriculture as a technical system as seen from his more encompassing view on 
the co-evolution of humanity and technology. Emphasis is laid on his notion of 
proletarianization and the way it affects farmers and peasants all over the world due to the 
corporate-controlled deployment of genetic engineering technologies in industrialized 
agriculture. Also discussed is Stiegler’s main theoretical insight that technologies must be 
considered as pharmaka, which means that they can both obstruct and advance the psychic 
and social individuation processes involved in the sociotechnical practices they support and 
can do so simultaneously. Given their pharmacological nature like any other technology, 
genetic engineering technologies can and should be re-deployed as tools to reverse the process 
of proletarianization and institute a new system of agriculture where farmers regain their lost 
ability to participate in the innovation processes and therefore the evolution of the technical 
milieu that constitutes their existence.  
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2. Main Philosophical Ideas 
 
2.1 Human Individuation and the Technical Milieu 
Stiegler’s philosophy of technology and technological change is rooted in a philosophical-
anthropological conception of man. The premise of his thinking is that man is fundamentally 
characterized by what he calls an ‘original lack of origin’ [défaut d'origine]. In contrast to 
animals, man is a being that is ‘substantially without essence’, i.e., a creature with no intrinsic 
or natural qualities. The proprium of man consists in his thoroughly accidental character and 
precisely for that reason the human condition is essentiallly the condition of technicity. In 
contrast to the metaphysical tradition unto Heidegger, Stiegler claims that man is a prosthetic 
being by essence (Stiegler, 2009b). Man’s temporal and historical mode of being, i.e., his 
involvement in a process of permanent becoming, is grounded in the original default.  
 Stiegler understands the structurally incomplete, technically constituted and 
conditioned process of becoming characteristic of man on the basis of the theory of 
individuation developed by French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon. Crucial in 
this theory is that individuals do not precede the process of their individuation, which means 
that there is no fixed principle of individuality. According to Simondon, psychic individuals 
can individuate only within and relative to a collective, as a process of psycho-collective co-
individuation. Stiegler adds a third term to this model: technology or the process of technical 
individuation (Stiegler, 2007). The human individuation process therefore involves not two 
but three terms, and it is the third term, that of the individuation of the technical system or 
technical milieu, that possesses a certain primacy, since technical innovation is the initiating 
factor in the typically human process of individuation (Stiegler, 2009c). This does not mean, 
to be sure, that technology would be ‘a-social’ in the sense that it would externally determine 
processes of psycho-collective individuation, yet it ‘over-determines’ them in the sense of 
conditioning them.  
 The technical system is the pre-individual milieu (also a term of Simondon) which 
allows the articulation of the individual psyches and the collective in the first place, but is also 
formed through the process of psycho-collective co-individuation. The relation between 
psyches, collectives and the technical milieu is transductive, meaning a relationship in which 
the constituting terms co-constitute each-other and only take shape in their relationship to 
each other. Stiegler speaks here of ‘organs’ and calls the study of the ever-changing relations 
throughout history between psychic organs, social organ-izations and the artificial organs of 
the technical milieu ‘general organology’, an extension of Simondon’s notion of mechanology 
(Stiegler, 2013). 
 The articulation of the processes of psychic individuation with the processes of 
collective individuation through the technical milieu constitutes a process of 
‘transindividuation’ that results in the formation of the ‘transindividual’ (once again a term of 
Simondon). This comprises everything that is shared by all individuals and meta-stabilizes 
itself in a certain way in the form of culture, language, customs, modes of production, social 
rules, moral principles and so on. The pre-individual milieu is both the product and the 
process of trans-individuation and the condition of the processes of psychic and collective 
individuation (Stiegler, 2007). It includes techniques that act as external memory supports, 
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initially only implicitly, but with the emergence of so-called ‘mnemotechniques’ like writing 
explicitly. It is constantly evolving, from clay tablets, papyrus, parchment and the printing 
press to radio, television, cinema, and the Internet. This means that the human is principally 
characterized by the adoption of always new technologies (Stiegler, 2009a). 
 
2.2 Techno-evolution and Epiphylogenesis 
Stiegler also theorizes technology and technological change from an evolutionary perspective 
on the human as a technical lifeform. He shows that human evolution is essentially a techno-
evolution, i.e., the process of anthropogenesis is fundamentally technogenic. Techniques act 
as external memories that are unique to the human species. What constitutes the humanity of 
the human and differentiates humans from other animals is a process of technical 
exteriorization, as Stiegler claims with French archaeologist and paleoanthropologist André 
Leroi-Gourhan. Human evolution is based on the transmission and accumulation of external, 
artificial memory supports that have initiated an entirely new process of evolutionary 
differentiation operating outside of the biological organism, i.e., not of genetic differentiation, 
but differentiation of technical prostheses, that nevertheless permanently interact with human 
biology (Stiegler, 1998). 
 Human culture, tradition, spirit, etc., are ultimately based on the very possibility of 
inheritance of technical artifacts that act as memory traces, i.e., as material carriers of 
exteriorized experience (Stiegler, 2004a). The process of hominization, then, is the process of 
technical exteriorization (and its subsequent interiorization). Stiegler calls the third, technical 
type of memory that is unique to humans epiphylogenetic memory and the process of 
evolution based on it epyhylogenesis, since it involves the transmission of individual (epi-) 
experience to the species (phylo-) (Stiegler, 1998). Anthropogenesis and human history can be 
described as a process of epiphylogenesis. In this process different stages or epochs can be 
distinguished. Each epiphylogenetic epoch makes certain forms of knowledge and experience 
possible. It provides the technological conditions of possibility for thinking and being in a 
certain period and structures as such what Heidegger thought of as the epochality of history. It 
includes both artifacts and symbols. Language and technology are two equiprimordial 
dimensions of the same process of exteriorization on which the evolution of man essentially 
rests (Stiegler, 2004a).  
 
2.3 Stiegler’s Pharmacological Conception of Technology 
What sets Stiegler apart from most other philosophers is his emphasis on the fact that human 
existence is essentially technically constituted and conditioned, which implies, among other 
things, that human autonomy cannot exist without heteronomy (Stiegler, 2013). In his most 
recent work he lays increasing emphasis on the fact that any technology, but in particular 
mnemotechnology, has the character of what he calls (after his teacher Derrida, who borrowed 
this term from Plato) a pharmakon (ibid.). This Greek word means both medicine and poison, 
in the sense of that which can both heal and make us sick. That is to say, technology functions 
for humans - as the animal that is fundamentally open and indeterminate and therefore in 
essential need of prostheses - simultaneously as that which ‘comes to the rescue’ of his 
indeterminacy in the sense of compensating for it, ‘curing’ it as it were, and as that which can 
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‘poison’ this indeterminacy, acting as a barrier to his freedom and thereby undermining his 
existence and world-disclosive capacity rather than supporting it. 
 In the case of mnemotechniques, this means that they can both elevate and frustrate 
the mind, that they can lead to both subjectivation and desubjectification and can be employed 
for emancipation and individuation as well as disciplining and disindividuation of the mind. 
In Foucaultian terms: they can act both as technologies of power and as technologies of the 
self. They can enhance autonomy and sociality but also heteronomize subjects and atomize 
societies. What is crucial is that technologies and the technical systems they constitute are in 
need of practices of care. As supported by a system of pharmaka, each culture is therefore 
necessarily a system of care: care for and through the pharmaka (ibid.).  
 Processes of individuation and subjectivation are crucially, and from the very outset, 
pharmacological in nature and the human being – as a being without origin – is a substantially 
pharmacological being. Fighting against the toxifying tendencies within the technical milieu 
of the mind presupposes that philosophy develops a critical pharmacology of technology. One 
of the technical milieus that is suffering from toxification due principally to the capitalist 
employment of the new and emerging pharmaka that enable its revolutionization is the global 
agricultural system. 
 
3. Stiegler’s View on Agricultural Innovation 
 
3.1 Agriculture as Technical System and System of Care 
Throughout its evolution and history, humans have always had to adopt new technologies, i.e., 
new technical systems. The arrival of a new technical system however, as Stiegler shows 
following the French historian of technology Bertrand Gille, always causes a disruption in the 
social system, suspending and actually destroying the system of care based on the preceding 
set of technologies and the skills evolved around them (Stiegler, 2009b). Initially, then, 
technological revolutions are destructive of ways of life and modes of existence. They bring 
about a maladjustment between the technical system and the social system, giving rise to a 
fundamental disorientation. Only by adjusting itself to the new technical system can the social 
system invent a new system of care based on the possibilities offered by the new technical 
system. In our days, agriculture is confronted with a new technological base - i.e., 
biotechnology, in particular the technologies that can manipulate life on the molecular level, 
which may destroy traditional lives of farmers all over the world. They also embody the 
possibility, though, of a new agriculture. 
 Like all culture, agriculture is a system of care (Stiegler, 2007). This is to say that it is 
a kind of therapeutic (from the Greek word therapeuein: to care, to take care of) in the sense 
that the practice of agriculture as the cultivation of (vegetable) life and, with it, the creation of 
artificial ecosystems, always entails a violation of the natural world, i.e., a disequilibration 
and disruption of ecological balances.Traditional Farmers are those who take care for the 
living and this always means selecting the living through technics. As a technically equipped 
and educated selector-cultivator, the traditional farmer is not simply a reproducer but also a 
producer of life. He breeds new life, new varieties, and in doing so he also transforms his own 
way of life, i.e., his world. In domesticating plants (and animals), the traditional farmer also 
5 
 
domesticates (in the sense of elevating) himself. And in transforming the world, in forming a 
new world, he must take care of this world and this taking care, as the very essence of 
agriculture, is a therapeutics that involves techniques which have essentially the character of 
pharmaka and necessarily involve knowledge, i.e., the knowhow [savoir-faire], skills and 
expertise based on these technologies. It is in particular this knowhow that ‘makes the 
farmer’, that constitutes his way of life, that is to say his existence. 
 The appearance of a new technical system always involves the appearance of a new 
kind of society and new social roles, i.e, a new modality of the process of psychic and 
collective individuation based engendered by a novel process of technical individuation 
(ibid.). Agricultural systems must also be understood as processes of such a kind, involving a 
common technological base and a variety of socio-technical roles. Agriculture actually entails 
a fourth process of individuation as well, which is the process of vital individuation of the 
plants and it can be argued that agriculture is centred around the care for, and the technical 
improvement of, processes of vital individuation of crops. What distinguishes contemporary 
agriculture from traditional agriculture is the fact that today it has become possible to directly 
intervene in these processes of vital individuation. This enables both a proletarianization of 
agricultural innovation, as currently happens predominantly, but it can also become the basis 
of a new mode of agriculture, which supposes a process of deproletarianization. 
 
3.2 The Biotechnology Revolution and the Corporate Control of Agriculture 
At the moment, we are in the midst of a huge rupture in the technological base of agriculture, 
particularly due to the new genetic engineering technologies that enable intervention in the 
very processes underlying the development and evolution of life. With these technologies 
becoming prevalent, the care and responsibility for the living is more and more transferred 
from farmers to biotechnologists. This could in principle lead to fruitful cooperations and to a 
sharing of responsibilities, but the problem is that today these technologies are everywhere 
turned into private property by the big agrotech multinationals with the principal aim of 
acquiring monopolies and ensuring profits, not of providing farmers with new innovative 
breeding tools. 
 Corporate control of these technologies represents the biggest threat to the knowhow 
of farmers and tothe care and responsibility for the living accompanying it. As Kloppenburg 
has shown, genetic engineering technologies ideally enable the capitalist penetration of 
agriculture and the conversion of farming into a wage labor activity, thereby transforming the 
farmer into a proletarian (Kloppenburg, 2004). This process of proletarianization of the farmer 
allows for the exploitation of his labor force but what is even more troubling for Stiegler, is 
the fact that this proletarianization involves a reduction of the existence of the farmer to the 
level of subsistence, substituting a mode of living with a mode of employment. Reduced to a 
subsistence mode of living, farmers lose the knowledge and knowhow through which they 
have always exercised their care and responsibility for the living. While discharging the 
farmer of the care and responsibility for biological innovation, corporate-led, privatized 
agriculture is not replacing it with an alternative practice of care and responsibility. It replaces 
it instead with a systemic carelessness and a complete absence of responsibility. 
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3.3 The Proletarianization of the Farmer and the Ruining of Agriculture as a System of Care  
From the perspective of Simondon, taken over by Stiegler, the proletarian is the one who, 
dispossessed of the means of production and turned into a unit of labor power, has lost his 
knowhow and it is in this that the real, and most problematic essence of proletarianization 
consists (Stiegler 2010a). Most problematic because it implies a dispossession of (the means 
of) taking care and responsibility for the living, which is exercised by farmers through their 
knowhow and more broadly through their way of life, their savoir-vivre. And it is this care 
and responsibility, which elevates them above subsistence level and makes them into existent 
human beings, that farmers all over the world do not want to lose. 
 The new genetic engineering technologies enable an expropriation of the most 
important and most central means of production in agriculture (the seed) through 
appropriation of the germ plasm. This implies an expropriation of the knowhow and 
knowledge of farmers and turns them into proletarians, disengaged from the responsibility for 
the living. This responsibility for breeding and selection will no longer be in the hands of the 
farmers but is delegated to scientists, who are themselves, just like farmers, increasingly 
functioning as employees for big corporations. Farmer’s modes of existence are in fact short-
circuited and thereby made obsolete through these new technologies (Stiegler, 2007). In the 
context of contemporary finance-capitalism, which has become more and more a purely 
speculative endeavor, carelessness and irresponsibility have become a systemic feature 
(Stiegler, 2010a). 
 Rejection of the privatization and corporatization of agriculture goes often hand in 
hand with an outright rejection of genetic engineering technology as such. However, the 
introduction of these technologies in agriculture does not necessarily imply their 
proletarianizing—and therefore careless and irresponsible—deployment by capitalism. They 
can be (re)possessed and (re)appropriated by farmers and turned into new tools for taking care 
and responsibility, tools for a new, thoroughly technologized and industrialized yet not 
proletarianized agriculture. The refusal of corporate agriculture should not lead to a refusal of 
the (bio) technologization of agriculture as such. What should be rejected is the 
proletarianizing ways in which they are put to use. 
 Stiegler’s thesis is that grammatization, the discretization and formalization of the 
continuous flows of natural processes that enable their exteriorization (Stiegler, 2004b), is the 
principal factor behind proletarianization, that is to say: its condition of possibility (ibid.). 
This grammatization of life in fact enables the short-circuiting of the process of reproduction 
of living organisms and, with it, the short-circuiting of the knowledge and knowhow of those 
who have traditionally been endowed with the care and responsibility for the reproduction of 
these organisms (and as selectors also with their production, i.e. with the creation of new life): 
the farmers. This actually makes the traditional lives of farmers obsolete, proletarianizing 
their mode of existence. The upshot of this is a loss of participation of the farmers in the 
development of their ‘own’ technical milieu, that is to say: in the very conditions determining 
agricultural production. This results in the formation of dissociated milieus, in which there is 
no association anymore between farmers and the technical system, neither between farmers 
among each-other. This finally means the ruining of their existence (and consistence) and its 
reduction to subsistence. Ultimately agriculture as a system of care collapses. What is needed 
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is a reversal of this process, i.e., a process of deproletarianization, and this can only come 
about as a therapeutic based on the very same technologies that are at the basis of 
proletarianization (Stiegler, 2013). 
 
3.4 Deproletarianization and the Pharmacological Turn 
As Stiegler contends, technologies, as the material effects of grammatization processes, are 
intrinsically ambiguous, in the sense that they can both foster and intensify and ruin and erode 
processes of psychic and social individuation, they can both support and undermine 
psychosocial individuation processes. Differently put: technologies can be conducive of both 
disindividuation and individuation (the former being more or less synonymous with 
proletarianization). It is for this reason that Stiegler theorizes technologies fundamentally as 
pharmaka (Stiegler 2010b). As already mentioned, technologies as pharmaka can 
simultaneously poison processes of psychocollective individuation and be employed to cure 
these processes. As a matter of fact, the only way to cure the poisoning effects of 
technological pharmaka is via these very same pharmaka, and that is by developing new 
practices around and on the basis of these pharmaka, i.e., practices of care (Stiegler, 2007). 
 This pharmacological view of technology is anything but a refashioning of the 
traditional idea of the neutrality of technology. On the contrary, the fact that technology 
conditions any process of individuation in a pharmacological way implies that psyches and 
collectives cannot ‘use’ or ‘apply’ technologies as they see fit from an autonomous and 
sovereign subjective standpoint. Instead, they have to negotiate with this condition as that 
which is foundational to their practices and can, as such, both support and undermine these 
practices. On the other hand, the fact that technologies condition processes of individuation 
does not rule out that they can be redesigned by ‘users’ to support new and alternative 
‘applications’. That which ultimately decides whether pharmaka act as a poison or function as 
a medicine—i.e., as a therapeutic—is the presence or absence of a practice of care, an 
economic practice to be sure, but one in which care is the ultimate value of the valorization 
process. This restores, according to Stiegler, the original sense of the word economy, as ‘to 
economize’ originally means to take care (Stiegler, 2013). Without a practice of care, 
pharmaka ‘support’ proletarianization, which means the absence of any practice and the 
exclusion of the user from participation in the evolution of the technical system which he 
depends on nevertheless. 
 Now, what the privatization and thus desocialization of the new biotechnologies by the 
big agrotech companies precisely prevents, is the formation of such practices of care around 
these technologies. The processes of innovation in agriculture are everywhere privatised and 
put under control—ultimately—of finance capitalism, short-circuiting the farmers as 
selectors—i.e., destroying the processes of psychocollective individuation and inducing 
dissociative, care-less milieus deprived of the possibility of responsible action.The new 
biotechnologies offer the possibility of a new, globalized and industrialized agriculture, but 
only on the condition that they can be appropriated by the actors within the technical milieu in 
which they are introduced, so that they are able to develop new practices and new modes of 
existence on the basis of these technologies. This possibility is currently frustrated because of 
the excessive privatization, i.e. dispossession and enclosure of these technologies. The 
8 
 
corporations who have massively taken hold of all these new, powerful and promising tools 
for innovation are emphatically unable—by virtue of their very nature as corporations—to 
rebuild a system of care, and to restore a long-term perspective, which is absolutely necessary 
for the creation of a new global agriculture, especially in the light of the global environmental 
and food crises.  
 The impending proletarianization of agriculture, made possible by and implemented 
through biotechnology, needs to be countered with a resolute project of deproletarianization, 
that is to say: not by rejecting the new biotechnologies but by reappropriating them, 
socializing them and turning them into elements of a new technical milieu that can function as 
the basis of a new, global agriculture. The future of biotechnologized agriculture cannot be 
entrusted to private companies who are totally devoid of care and incapable of taking 
responsibility for life on earth, both the life of crops and the life of the people who live from 
these crops. To prevent a rampant decline of agriculture into agribusiness and to allow for the 
possibility of reconstituting agriculture as a system of care, one needs to socialize the new 
technologies and make the future of agriculture subject to our collective responsibility. The 
deproletarianization of agriculture, an absolute necessity for the future of humankind, 
therefore needs to go hand in hand, as Kloppenburg emphasizes, with a battle for the 
repossession of the means of taking care of agricultural production, which has always been a 
social activity, i.e., a process of psycho-collective individuation based on the sharing of 
knowledge and knowhow (Kloppenburg 2010). 
 The first steps towards repossession and deproletarianization, as Lemmens (Lemmens, 
2014) has argued, may already be on the horizon with the introduction of the principles of 
open source innovation in the agricultural context. Open source innovation, which originated 
the world of software development, not only involves a ‘repossession’of the means of 
production through the creation of a ‘protected commons’ (Kloppenburg, 2010), but also an 
effort to re-autonomize the knowledge production and creation of knowhow that is 
continuously expropriated from farmers with a view to restore this knowledge and knowhow 
at the psycho-collective level and so to regain the ability to participate in the transformation of 
their own technical milieu and its modes of production, and as such to become the creators 
and authors again of their own lifeworlds and their own existence—and to be able to take care 
and responsibility for it. Open source may be the first vital step in the transformation of the 
new biotechnical pharmaka from corporate biotechnologies of control-from-the-outside into 
commonly-owned biotechnologies enabling a caring and more intelligent agriculture, 
endogenously ‘controlled-from-within’, that is to say agriculture as a genuine system of care 
(ibid.).This might as well lead, eventually, to a trajectory of agricultural innovation that 
deviates from the dominant tendency of increasing biotechnologization. However, from 
Stiegler’s perspective – and considered as a phase within the history of grammatization – 
biotechnology appears as something that is here to stay. Its ultimate destination, however, is 
anything but decided and will depend on the ways in which it will be adopted by social actors. 
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